« EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT »

Civil Society Input into the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Working Group Meeting in Kinshasa, 13-14 April 2011

This document has been compiled based on consultations among a number of civil society organizations and civil society networks coordinated by Interpeace. It is presented with the best interest of citizens in conflict affected areas in mind. It draws on the perspectives of civil society organizations involved in relief, development, peacebuilding and statebuilding in several countries experiencing challenges of conflict and fragility around the world – as well as international civil society organizations focusing on these issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of Interpeace.

This input draws on a variety of sources:

- Day of discussion and feedback on a draft version of this paper by representatives of International Alert, Saferworld, West African Network for Peacebuilding, African CSO Platform for Principled Partnership, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office and Interpeace. The Hague, April 2011
- "Voices of Civil Society Organisations on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding." 2010, Geneva, Interpeace. Prepared as an input to the Dili meeting in April 2010. The report summarises the input of 49 civil society organisations, of which 30 from the global south.
- "United Nations Review of International Civilian Capacities. Results of a civil society survey." December 2010, Geneva, Interpeace. This report summarises the views of 34 civil society organisations, of which 22 from the 'South'.
- Responses to a questionnaire in March 2011 sent to CSO partners, of which 6 from Conciliation Resources partners in the global south.
- "Civil Society Consultation on the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding." 2011 London, Saferworld – consisted of field level consultations in Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan.
- "Strengthening Capacities for Peace." 2008 Geneva/Brussels, training materials developed for the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office

This input also refers to related and relevant work on statebuilding and peacebuilding and on CD, by the DAC and by others. These are identifiable in the end notes.

I. The Conversation on External Assistance to Capacity Development in the IDPS Working Group.

- We believe the topic of 'capacities' and notably of 'national/local capacities' is of strategic importance. We are appreciative of the desire to improve CD and the efforts already made.
- The conversations about 'capacities' need to be actively linked to those of the other Working Groups of the IDPS. This raises for example the questions about 'capacities for planning and public participation in planning', 'capacities for effective political dialogue, including national dialogue among the national actors', and 'capacities to discuss, monitor and evaluate the types of aid provided and how it is provided'.
- We recall that we are talking about capacities in the context of peacebuilding and statebuilding in fragile states – often countries that have experienced significant levels of large scale violence.
- We recall the DAC's own understanding of statebuilding in fragile situations:
  "*Statebuilding needs to be understood in the context of state-society relations: the evolution of a state's relationship with society is at the heart of statebuilding. Statebuilding is a deeply political process, and understanding the context – especially what is perceived as legitimate in a specific context- is crucial if*

international support is to be useful. Statebuilding is first and foremost an endogenous process: there are therefore limits as to what the international community can and should do." [i]

"*To understand the dynamics of statebuilding with a view to improving the ability of external actors to support the movement from fragility to resilience, this guidance focuses on three critical aspects that underpin the social contract and are at the core of state-society relations:*

The political settlement, which reflects the implicit or explicit agreement (among elites principally) on the 'rules of the game', power distribution and the political processes through which state and society are connected. The capability and responsiveness of the state to effectively fulfill its principal functions and provide key services. Broad social expectations and perceptions about what the state should do, what the terms of the state-society relationship should be and the ability of society to articulate demands that are 'heard'." [ii]

The following considerations guide the submission by civil society:

In the context of peacebuilding and statebuilding, the question of 'whose capacities for what' directs us to capacities for 'good governance' and 'constructive conflict management and –transformation'. These capacities are required within the state but also throughout society. [iii] Fairly well functioning societies have a fairly capable state, a fairly capable society, and fairly functioning political processes through which both debate and bargain. Extensive and well informed public participation is central prerequisite for decent governance and for the development of effective and trusted state institutions.

The discussion about 'capacities' needs to distinguish between different types of capacities: resources (money, people, time), knowledge and skills, attitudes and mindsets, influence and power. Generally CD efforts do not pay sufficient attention to the latter two.

Efforts at improving the effectiveness of state institutions particularly in service delivery, and efforts at improving the effectiveness of 'technical assistance', are valid and merit attention. But they also only touch upon a small part of the overall question of what capacities are needed in state and society and in their interaction, to be able to function in a viable way.

Significant questions to be considered are:

- What support can external actors bring – and how- to strengthen the capacities of the public sector to be transparent, responsive and accountable, and to work effectively and with integrity and without discrimination in the service of all citizens?
- What support can external actors bring –and how- to strengthen the awareness of people throughout society that they are 'citizens', with rights and obligations towards the state?
- What support can external actors bring – and how- to strengthen the capacities of state and society for greater and inclusive public participation in identifying the problems, shaping the vision for the future and pathways to get there, and to monitor and periodically evaluate overall progress?
- What support can external actors bring-and how- to strengthen political processes other than elections, and political mechanisms other than political parties and parliaments, through which 'citizens' ("whole-of-society") can debate, demand and bargain with the state?
- How can external actors work jointly with national and local capabilities to assess what critical capacities may need strengthening, how this can best be done and by whom, and to jointly monitor and evaluate the efforts and achievements in this regard?
- What capacities are required among those wishing to strengthen the capacities of others?

II. Our Recommendations.

1. *Promote CD as a Central Strategic Objective.*

The ability of a country (state & society) to competently and constructively manage its own affairs is critical. Increased capacities to do so should be a critical yardstick to measure any external assistance and 'aid effectiveness' by. Increased national and local 'capacities for peace' would be a major indicator of 'success' of external peacebuilding assistance. In this light we also support the recommendation of the DAC Working Group on capacity development, that evidence of CD processes, progress and results is required to 'make the case' to top management and across stakeholders. [iv]

2. *Invest in the Capacities of Society, not only those of the State.*

Fragile states are often states where the governance relationship has not been working well. At least a part of the population has lost trust in the state institutions, and often the state has become contested. It is imperative then not only to (re-) build state institutions but also the trust in those institutions. That requires significant attention to and investment in the 'political processes' for interaction between state and society. There are no effective states without informed and active citizens. This concerns but is not limited to 'parliament', 'political parties' and 'civil society organisations' in the narrow sense of 'NGOs'. There is significant experience and learning with many forms of public participation. Effective public participation however requires that people are informed – and hence enjoy a legally protected 'right to information',[v] and that spaces are created and facilitated where the asymmetries in power, knowledge and confidence, between ordinary people and the state actors but also the international assistance actors, are consciously mitigated and reduced.

> "*Building the national public sphere is good for development in all cases, not only in war-to-peace transitions*." [vi]

In addition, we need to be mindful of the gap between 'normative' and 'realistic expectations' [vii] Western donors should be all the more receptive to this argument, now that public budget deficits in many countries are forcing significant cuts in public expenditure – and being accompanied by calls for more individual and collective citizen initiatives.

3. *Support the Development of National and Local Institutional Capacities – in State and Society – beyond 'Service Delivery'.*

Research has identified a wider set of five capabilities that are critical for organisations[viii]

- *Capability to carry out technical, service delivery and logistical tasks:* This depends on abilities such as strategic planning and management, financial management and implementation/delivery.
- *Capability to commit and engage.* Without it, individuals and organizations risk getting stuck in a 'low commitment, low capacity, low performance' trap that is the result of a complex mix of political, material, social, cultural and psychological influences and that technical approaches to capacity development cannot overcome. Institutions are only as good as the people operating them.
- *Capability to relate and to attract resources and support.* This is the crucial capability to survive and maintain one's autonomy in a wider dynamic and competitive environment. It requires the ability to

connect to other actors and attract new sources of funding, of staff, of learning, and of protection. Organisations that can gain and maintain legitimacy, operating space and buffering are better able to sustain themselves in challenging contexts. It is a capability that can also backfire, when survival becomes the dominant objective. Core abilities here are those that: earn credibility and legitimacy and the trust of others; that buffer the entity from intrusions and that can combine dynamic political positioning with assertive communications.

- *Capability to adapt and self-renew.* Individuals and organizations often operate in situations of change, both internally and in the external environment, and therefore need to be able to reposition themselves and adapt. This implies foresight; understanding and reacting to global and societal changes; dynamic leadership able to mobilize all staff, and a constant need for internal brainstorm and discussion, but also individual and organizational learning. It also implies the ability to identify and incorporate good ideas from 'outside'.

- *Capability to balance diversity and coherence.* Effective organizations manage to encourage different identities and capabilities because they offer a variety of perspectives and ways of thinking, which staves off complacency, fosters creativity and thereby builds resilience. Yet they also need to avoid fragmentation which could lead to a loss of focus or the organization breaking apart. Related balancing acts are between 'soft' and 'hard' capabilities, the 'technical' and the 'political', internal and external focus, the short and the long-term, centralization and decentralization etc. Such balancing act will require managing tensions and dilemmas, and regularly require trade-offs. Communication skills are an important ability to pull this off successfully.

It is not possible for non-state associations and institutions to develop genuine organisational capacities only with short-term 'project funding'. Most continue to have significant difficulties in accessing especially bilateral and multilateral funding. If donors are prepared to provide partial or substantial budget support to a national government, it is hard to see why they would be so shy about providing partial or substantial budget support to national and local non-state actors. The risks are no different and the sums usually much smaller. If it is accepted that ultimately it are the national actors that need to make peace with each other and have to take responsibility for the quality of their own governance, then it is recommended that donors allocate a proportion of their budgets for national and local peacebuilders. It is accepted that fairly long-term external core funding is usually not an option for international donors. Then provide more support (ideas and expertise) on how national/local institutions can become financially more self-sustaining.

Three thematic capacity areas for investment – in both state and non-state sectors are:

- *National Policy Capacities*: There are already some proposals on the table to develop or strengthen national statistical capacities, the usefulness of which for government is obvious. But it is equally valid to strengthen national policy capacities i.e. capacities to research, propose, analyse and evaluate public policies. That capacity needs to exist in governmental but also in non-state sectors of society.

- *National Monitoring and Evaluation Capacities*: According to the DAC's own guidance, evaluations can be important tools for accountability and for learning. Yet most evaluations are poorly disseminated within the countries concerned. Few also evaluate the external partner or assistance actors. Independent national monitoring and evaluation capacities can counterbalance the current prevailing pattern. These evaluations can underpin parliamentary reviews of the effectiveness of national and international actions in the country. [ix] National evaluation capacities are also better placed to do longitudinal monitoring and evaluation, picking up influences and impacts that may only become apparent several years after the completion of a 'project' or 'intervention'.

- *National Training Capacities*: Stronger regional and national training capacities are an investment worth making. It increases the likelihood that training is adapted to context and culture, can be conducted in local languages, and hence be more appropriately tailored. The costs of training and follow-up are also likely to be less.

4. Build Capacity Development into every Intervention from the Outset.

The DAC Working group on capacity development recommended that CD be integrated from the outset into sector policies, plans and programmes. There is no reason to limit this to 'sector' work. The principle is valid for any action that gets external support. CD objectives can and must be explicitly included in any results framework and also monitored, evaluated and reported on. CD largely practiced through one-off and stand-alone interventions is generally not very effective.[x]

5. How - The Capacity to Support and Strengthen the Capacities of Others.

Strengthening the capacities of others requires certain capacities of oneself. This is under-appreciated among the external assistance actors – though not so among the CD-support recipients. Some key observations:

- *Mindset*: Don't start from the premise that the other has no capacities. This is discouraging and demotivating and contaminates the relationship from the outset.[xi] A 'failed state' does not mean 'failed people'. If 'resilience' is the objective, then surely the extraordinary resilience that people have shown during often long years of violence and displacement, should be an extraordinary resource to build on.

- *Capacity assessment approaches*: Although in the humanitarian sector tools such as 'Capacities and Vulnerabilities Assessment' have long been available, the dominant paradigm remains the 'needs assessment'. This reflects the mindset that looks for the gaps and weaknesses and deficits. We need to develop or disseminate – and use- approaches that allow us to recognize existing capacities. We also need approaches where the potential recipient and provider can jointly determine which capacities are required for what and when, and jointly specify the standards, indicators and benchmarks to assess whether they are getting stronger or not. They also need to discuss and jointly determine what sort of capacity-support will be appropriate and what requirements are needed of those providing it.

- *Organisational Expertise in CD:* "*Most funding agencies have assumed that supporting capacity development required no special individual or organizational skills or dedicated internal units, as has been the case with gender, the environment or performance management. The assumption was that capacity issues were already mainstreamed, albeit informally. Yet, perversely, capacity development turns out to require expertise in areas such as political analysis, management theory and practice, and change management, which has always been in short supply in such agencies.*" [xii]

- *Long term placements in national and local entities:* Rather than building up their own big and more operational structures in country, luring away many talented national people, external assistance providers are advised to support long-term placements of people with particular skills and expertise in national and local institutions. Knowledge exchange (and not just knowledge transfer) would be an explicit part of the terms of reference for the placement. Criteria for the selection of such

secondments or placements must include attitudinal requirements such as cultural awareness, modesty and strong interpersonal skills.

- *South-South exchanges*: We endorse the calls for more support for South-South exchanges already made in other fora.[xiii] In this context we also recommend support for the strengthening of regional civil society networks. We see value in calling upon people from the diaspora but also caution against simply seeing them as a source of 'capacity'. The diaspora may also include members of a political opposition that from a distance influenced and continue to try and influence the dynamics in country. They may have come from an urban elite background and never have been in touch with the experiences and views of other citizens in their own society. They may fail to appreciate the changes that have happened in their society during years of violence. They do get contested by those who 'stayed during the violence' and who feel that they deserve the job opportunities. They will be challenged if they and their families do not use the health and educational services of the country but continue to seek opportunities and services abroad.

- *Careful with the 'Cluster Model' and 'Global Service Provider'*: The UN report on Civilian Capacities in the Aftermath of Conflict recommends the adoption of the cluster approach that is by now well established in the humanitarian sector, in other areas of post-conflict work. Concomitant with that it would also like to see a broader adoption of the global service provider model. [xiv] There are two potential problems with this: In practice the participating agencies in the 'cluster' and the 'global service providers' may turn out to be predominantly 'external' actors (again hiring away for themselves the best national talents), and taking the humanitarian sector as inspiration is likely to reinforce the mindset that the target population only has needs and no capacities.

- *Training and workshops*: Training and workshops are one of the most common 'tools' intended to develop capacities. Many of them are one off and stand alone events. There is ample evidence available to show that the impact and effectiveness of isolated training and workshops is very limited. We need to practice what has been learned about how to make training events and workshop more effective.[xv]

For more information on the CSO engagement with the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, or would you wish to contribute as a CSO to this process, please contact pbsb@interpeace.org

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ANNEX 1. Public Participation, the Capacity to Support CD, and the Effectiveness of Training and Workshops.
Additional notes.

1. <u>Potential Benefits of Much Public Participation.</u>

Well functioning societies not only have state institutions that can 'deliver' but also much civic engagement and a strong public sphere in which citizens and states can interact. Potential benefits of pro-active, extensive and inclusive public participation are:

- Know the interests of the people better
- Represent the public better – reduces the gap between people and 'their' representatives
- Reduces / counterbalances the influence of special-interest groups
- Broad public participation gives public policies a great legitimacy
- Improves the quality of policy and its implementation
    - More ideas: draws on local knowledge and ideas from citizens (diagnosis, proposed solutions)
    - Public policy decisions will have greater relevance to local needs and conditions
    - Broader ownership over public policy choices facilitates their implementation
    - Broader ownership over public policy choices facilitates sustainability
    - Limits the potential for corruption
    - Corrects injustice situations
- Empowers and educates the public
- Strengthens accountability and transparency of governance
- Strengthens trust in government

2. <u>Critical Attributes for Those Who Want to Support the Capacity Development of Others.</u>

Research (Baser and Morgan 2008: 118) has identified a set of critical attributes for those who want to support the capacity development of others.

- Maintain adaptability and flexibility;
- Remain open to finding the best match between the type of intervention and the nature of the capacity challenge;
- Foster strong interpersonal relations and trust;
- Develop detailed knowledge of country contexts, which means less rotation of your own personnel;
- Promote the reality rather than the image of national and local ownership and control, and accept the implications;
- Adopt open-ended approaches to planning and experimentation;
- Foster the legitimacy of country groups and organizations in the eyes of stakeholders;
- Encourage downward accountabilities (i.e. towards local stakeholders rather than towards external actors/donors);
- Accept long-term evolutionary processes;
- Be aware of shifts in the nature of the aid relationship.

3. <u>Making Training and Workshops more Effective.</u>

Collaborative learning has identified a few factors that can enhance their effectiveness:

- The event is part of a wider and longer-term capacity-strengthening strategy;
- The content is locally grounded and practical, and experiences and examples from other contexts are presented in a pragmatic way;
- Participants are carefully selected on their likelihood to be in a position to use what they learn to affect the wider dynamics around them and/or have the active support of senior people;
- There is a critical mass of participants, either from the same institution or from the same operating environment;

- Participants have more or less a similar level of knowledge and experience, there are not vast differences;
- There is a team leading the event, ideally involving a local person, and someone with genuine practical experience;
- The event is highly interactive, with participants engaging with each other and questioning and learning from each other;
- The learning style is 'Socratic', i.e. it seeks to draw out the knowledge among the participants while also inviting them to reflect more deeply on it;
- There are opportunities to try out what is being learned (role play, action-planning… - *I hear and I forget. I see and I understand. I do and I remember.*)
- There is ongoing support after the event, when participants are struggling to apply what they have learned.

Drawn from Anderson, M. & L. Olson 2003: Confronting War. Boston, CDA Inc. pp. 76-82 and Sprenger D. 2005: The Training Process. Achieving social impact by training individuals? Berlin, Berghof Center, Berghof Handbook.

ANNEX 2. Societal Capacities to Constructively Engage with the State in Contexts of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. Some examples.

All of the following examples show national / local actors in the lead. In every instance there was and often still is ongoing external capacity support, in its various forms. But never in such a way that the national/local actors would be overtaken by the international ones.

The examples should not be misread as statements about the nature of the country mentioned. 'Fragility' and 'resilience' – as the DAC itself has underlined – are not fixed labels. Rather, all countries oscillate between fragility and resilience. Even normally very resilient countries will periodically experience 'moments of higher fragility'.

The examples also show that the ability of state and society to constructively work together generates an overall increased capacity to overcome the often significant challenges that all contemporary societies face. The challenges are often too big to be overcome by one major actor alone.

1. Kenya- Violence and political settlement.

Kenya is not considered a fragile state. Yet significant violence erupted in early 2008 over the disputed results of a national election. Government and opposition entered into a highly antagonistic relationship, while violence among people led to many deaths, rapes, extensive displacement and much loss of and damage to property. This was certainly a 'fragile moment'. How it was handled would have significant consequences.

Two main citizen-driven interventions emerged, the 'Concerned Citizens for Peace', led and supported directly and indirectly by civil society groups that had the respect of both government and citizens, and another group, supported by a civil society organization, that over time had build credibility with different governments across Africa, for their mediation efforts and neutrality.

The first group focused on collecting evidence on behalf of citizens, persuading citizens to stop fighting, and mobilizing citizens to stand against politicians promoting violence. The second group worked with both the government and the international community to build a platform for dialogue and negotiations. Resources were rapidly made available to both groups.

The pressure from citizens and their engagement with both government and the international community played a critical role in halting the violence and restoring peace. The citizen groups gathered crucial evidence that informed most of the peacebuilding efforts, as well as the ongoing justice programme at the international level.

The peace and statebuilding effort continues to be monitored by both the donors and citizens, with the government borrowing some of the capacity from citizens during one of the key outcomes of the peace effort: a constitutional referendum.

2. Timor Leste- Violence and leadership.

By 2005, Timor Leste was internationally heralded as a 'success story'. After a period of intense violence in 1999, it had successfully separate from Indonesia, and gained formal independence in 2002. The international presence in the intermediate years had been very extensive. Most international actors were taken by surprise when serious violence broke out among East Timorese in the spring of 2006. More peacekeepers and international funding returned. That finally enabled an international NGO to work with its Timorese partner to initiate a process of facilitated public discussion among the Timorese people. In a year and a half the Timorese Centre of Studies for Peace and Development (CEPAD) organised a public debate in each of the 13 districts. Some 900 people participated. This was completed with three regional conferences, in the East, Middle and West of the country, with over 300 participants attending those. That process identified 33 issues that the Timorese people saw as important for achieving lasting peace. One of these was the obvious disconnect between citizens and the country's leaders.

CEPAD then organised a two day 'National Forum' in August 2009, which brought together some 200 people from all walks of life in Timor Leste. This included top politicians – also of the political opposition- members of the church, academia, NGOs, the army and the police. But almost half of the participants had come from the 13 districts.

The National Forum reviewed and debated the findings of the previous consultation process, and then chose four priorities for CEPAD to concentrate on and find ways of mitigating or resolving them.

One of these was "The promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest. This is a complex and troubling phenomenon in a context where the institutions of the state are unable to withstand personal and party agendas. As such, the State is prevented from consolidating influence and from projecting and protecting the interests of the Timorese as a whole." (idem p. 18) CEPAD has since

> « Leaders often see a public that wants everything and is generally uninformed, with little to contribute to policy making, where the public sees decision-making processes completely taken over by special interests and partisan battling. »
>
> *CEPAD: Priorities for Peace. 2010:13*

brought together an influential 'working group' of people on this issue that is seeking ways of addressing this problem. It will present its proposals and recommendations at another 'national conference'.

Significant here is that this is a Timorese-led and Timorese-owned process, addressing a highly sensitive but important issue. It is also an example of 'capacities in society' to act as a channel and connector, reducing the disconnect between leaders and the population at large (and between the 'national' or 'capital-city' world and the 'local' or 'periphery') and create spaces for discussion and collective problem-solving.

3. Guatemala - Democratic security.

Very comprehensive Peace Accords in 1996 formally ended Guatemala's decades-long civil war. But that didn't mean that doctrines, policies and practices changed overnight, nor mindsets. Fifteen years later, Guatemala is again faced by a major security crisis, mostly the result of organised crime and violent youth gangs. The homicide rate today is higher than during the civil war. In the past 15 years therefore, Guatemalans have had to overcome the legacy of the civil war, and are now facing a new type of violence that cannot be addressed by returning to authoritarian and undemocratic practices that violate human rights.

For the past decade intensive and sustained work has been going on between government (civilian and security forces side) and national civil society, on various aspect of 'democratic security' (the military, police, intelligence services,

national security policy and institutional coordination and collaboration around it, private security companies etc.) . This has been accompanied by investments in thematic knowledge and policy capacities especially among a set of civil society organisations (where external expertise was called upon this came primarily from other Latin American countries that had gone from authoritarian to democratic rule). As a result Guatemalan civil society actors today are fully equipped to discuss the legal, institutional, moral, doctrinal and policy aspects of the many sub-themes under 'democratic security'. These competencies in civil society are also recognized, and institutional channels have been created for their interaction with the state on this topic. Two prominent such channels are a Liaison Office with the Parliament, and a Security Advisory Council directly connected to the office of the President. It is by no means exceptional nowadays to see Guatemalan governments recruit civil society expertise into their administrations.

4. Nimba County, Liberia - Land conflict and local governance.

In Liberia, by 2008 the government had become quite concerned about what it saw as land disputes in Nimba county, with ethnic overtones. Nimba county played an important role during the Liberian civil war, where ethnicity had been a factor in the mobilizations around different sides. Liberians, with international financial and methodological support, conducted a series of consultations all over the county to try and establish a clearer diagnosis of the problem and what the people in Nimba thought should be done about it. Over a thousand people participated. This confirmed that land-related conflicts were indeed the priority, but that many such conflicts did not have ethnic overtones. The more fundamental cause was the different and conflicting systems of 'ownership'. This poses significant legal challenges that are difficult to overcome without generating more conflict. But meanwhile the biggest gap identified was that of local 'mediation and conflict resolution' skills and capacities, a result of the breakdown of traditional authority and the lack of capacities of (and trust in) the modern state institutions.

The Nimba consultation also revealed other grievances among the local population, notably a fairly widespread distrust of the local state authorities. One expression of this were allegations of misuse of funds devolved to the local authorities for local development. There were no spaces for dialogue between the local authorities and local populations. Subsequent focus group discussions with people from Nimba again generated concrete proposals: a Code of Conduct for the local government officials, and the collective design and implementation of 'social audit' mechanisms. We can see how in this context literacy and numeracy, and the disclosure of the local budgets and their use have a role to play in enabling people ('citizens') to conduct such 'social audit'. If things would progress along these lines, years later we can imagine local level practices of 'participatory budgeting'.

5. Puntland (Northeast Somalia) – Influencing budget allocations.

Open budgets (incomes, allocations and expenditures) at national and local level are a central requirement for parliaments and citizens at large to be able to discuss and debate with the state the critical choices and tradeoffs that need to made. This is not only in the interest of citizens but also of the state – it can significantly reduce the level of mistrust in government and thereby the cost of governance.

Some years ago, no public information was available about the incomes and expenditures of the Puntland Regional Administration in north-east Somalia. With some effort, a non-state actor started putting together information about the incomes and resource allocations of the regional administrations budget. It transpired that the resource allocations to health and education were very small. They then worked effectively with the Puntland authorities to see these increased.

Some international assistance actors have deliberately invested in enhancing the capacities of their non-state partners, to understand and analyse national budgets.

We also see here and in the previous example from Liberia, how the discussion on 'capacities' relates to that about 'planning' but also that of 'aid instruments'.

6. Rwanda- Rule of law and arbitrariness.

A number of years ago, an ongoing participatory-action-research programme on the rule of law, managed by a Rwandan non-state actor, drew attention to the fact that perceived arbitrariness was a major obstacle to the rule of law.

Areas where arbitrariness was identified were: government-led accelerated rural development programmes where rural Rwandans often failed to understand the rationale behind various policies or how they were implemented; detention beyond the maximum 72 hours when someone has to appear before a court; too loose an interpretation of 'public interest' in decisions to expropriate private citizens and too little compensation coming late; perceived unfairness in the confiscation of vehicles and driving documents and/or excessive fines by the traffic police, with no real mechanism to appeal police decisions.

The Rwandan non-state actor initiated a process of extensive consultations with all key stakeholders, specialist and non-specialists for each of the issues. For the traffic control question for example, this included among others the traffic police itself, the Rwanda Utilities Regulation Agency, professional drivers, taxi companies, the ASETAMORWA – an association of motorcycle riders.

On some of the topics it produced not only reports but also videos and/or organised a day-long 'national forum' on the issue, covered by the media. It also took the respective issue to parliamentarians, and concerned national ministries and commissions.

Such multi-stakeholder mobilization in a framework that allowed the objective discussion and analysis of a perceived problem, and the collaborative search for solutions, has already started to show its influence and impacts.

7. Israel. The capacity of minorities to discuss their rights and responsibilities with the state.

Israel is of course not considered a 'fragile state'. It doesn't even qualify for ODA. But it faces formidable challenges in incorporating and balancing the demands of sectors of its society, that have quite different views and expectations of the state and possibly different visions of the future. One significant debate – among Jews- is that between 'secular' and 'religious' visions. Another that between Jews and non-Jewish Israeli citizens, notably 'Arabs' (which can be Muslim, Druze, Christian, secular etc.), which turns around the question of whether Israel can be both a 'Jewish' and a 'democratic' state.

During 2005-6 a process took place in the community of Palestinians living in Israel, who are Israeli citizens. They constitute a significant minority (close to 20% of the population) but have objectively been marginalized and discriminated against by the largely Jewish Israeli state. Periodically this led to street protests and clashes with the police. The process took place under the umbrella of the 'High Follow Up Committee for the Arabs in Israel" and the "National Committee for the Heads of the Local Arab Councils in Israel". Discussions were structured around specific topics. The process was owned and led by members of the concerned minority, with international financial and some methodological support. It produced –for the first time- a common self-definition for this minority ("Palestinian Arabs in Israel") and a common document ("The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel"). This process, formally framed in order to produce a 'future vision', also strengthened the capacity of this section of population to clarify its collective identity, articulate positions on critical issues and enter into discussion with the state on the basis of 'proposals' rather than 'protest'.

The point of this example is not to argue something about Israel, but to highlight a critical capacity in society: the capacity to develop thoughtful proposals to the state, proposals that are the outcome of an inclusive and participatory process. In Latin America this is summarized with a well-known phrase: 'de contesta a propuesta' – from contestation to proposing.

End notes:

[i] Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Fragility and Conflict. Executive summary." 2011. OECD/DAC INCAF

[ii] Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility. Policy Guidance. 2011. OECD Publ. p. 30

[iii] See e.g. UNRISD 2004: Technocratic Policy Making and Democratic Accountability. Geneva, Research and Policy Brief 3

[iv] Capacity Development in Aid Business Processes : Getting it right. » OECD DAC Issues brief 9, January 2011 p. 2

[v] See e.g Darbishire, H. Proactive Transparency. The future of the right to information. Washington, D.C, World Bank Institute & International Budget Partnership 2011: Open Budgets. Transform Lives. The Open Budget Survey 2010. US, Mexico, South Africa and India

[vi] von Kaltenborn-Stachau, H. 2008: The Missing Link. Fostering positive citizen-state relations in post-conflict environments. Washington D.C. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank p. 6

[vii] Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility. Policy Guidance. 2011. OECD Publ. p. 35.

[viii] Baser, H. & Morgan, P. 2008: Capacity, Change and Performance. Maastricht, European Centre for Development Policy Management, pp. 26-33

[ix] This reiterates proposal 7 of the"Peacebuilding Forum" Conference report 2004. The report captures the results of a high level conference in New York, that concluded an extensive and inclusive process of consultation and discussion between internal and external actors about the quality of their relationship. This involved both governmental and non-state actors on both sides. Geneva/New York. WSP-International & International Peace Academy.

[x] Southern Perspectives on Capacity Development. Time to act and learn. 2009: OECD/DAC Issues Briefing no.6.

[xi] See e.g. Pardington, N. & M. Coyne 2007: An African Perspective on Capacity Building. In Forced Migration Review Issue 28 p.22

[xii] Baser & Morgan 2008: pp. 116-117

[xiii] See the High Level Event on 'South-South Cooperation and Capacity Development' that took place in Bogotá in March 2010.

[xiv] Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict. Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group. Key recommendations, New York, UN p.2

[xv] See e.g. Anderson, M. & L. Olson 2003 Confronting War. Boston, CDA Inc. pp. 76-82 and Sprenger D. 2005: The Training Process. Achieving social impact by training individuals? Berlin, Berghof Center, Berghof Handbook.